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CROWDING.OUTAND
CROWDING.IN EFFECTS OF
POLICYREFORMS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
:

ri

F. L. OSUNSADE
outlays provide inducements for
INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomic irnbalances in

mixed enterprise

economies
frequently reflect excessive claims
orr financial resources by the public
as against the private sector,
thereby putting unfavourable
pressures on prices and the balance
of payments ln the absence of
interest rate ceilings, such
crowding-out forces would operate
directly via upward pressures on the
cost funds in the domes-'ic financial
market, with similar consequences
on external and internal stability. The
tighlening of fiscal policy and the
related unwinding of the
crowding-out effect should thus lead
generally to an easing of market
conditions for private sector driven
revival of economic activity,
including financial stability. On the

other hand, it is fairly

well

private investments, due to technical
complernentarities and external
economies - i.e. the crowding-in
effect. Accordingly, the proc,,:ss of
macroeconomic
correcting
imbalances while at the same time

promoting renewed

economic
growth would involve interaction of
factors related to both the crowdingout and crowding-in effects.

This paper is intended to discuss
the interplay of these two effects in

the context of

growth-oriented

adjustment programs in developing
countries, and to highlight some of
the policy implications. A discussion
of the nature and determinants of

phenomena in a
developing-country conten is given
in Section ll. Section lll presents
some conclusions and practical

the two

implications of the analysis.
On the basis of conventional
textbook models of rational

maximizing agents, smoothly
clearing markets, and all-rational

documented (e.9., Aschauer, D.,
1989; Taylor, L., 1989) that public

expectations (i.e., perfect foresight),

investments and other relevant fiscal

raises

public investment that

aggregate investment beyond the
level consklered optimal by private

economic agents could have

a

on investment
the private sactor,

crowding-out effect

activity

in

depending on the expected impact
of incremental public investment on
the rate of return on capital. Glven
the characteristic large gap between
prevailing economic activity lwels

and

production posslbllftles ln
developing countries, lt seems
reasonable to suppose tfnt tho
danger of such an investment
crowding-out effect would, kt

minimal ln such
countries; for this reason, the
general,

be

analysis below abstracts lrom such
a negative feedback of public capltal

outlays, on private sec'tor
investments. ln addition, to avert
undue diversion into likely negatlve

aM

positive (e.9.,

confiderrce,

stability, and technologlcal spin-ofQ
effects of military sponding (Benolt,
E., 1973; Looney, R.E., 1990), all
references to puUic outlays ln what

follows

are intended to

mean

nonmilitary expenditures.
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ln general, as between developed
and developing countries, it may be
expected that CIC schedules for the
former group of countries would be
relatively {arther from the origin--i.e.,

given incremental public
investment would be associated
with greater private investment
response, due, for example, to
a

comparatively better infrastructural
base and, of course, the greater
savings and investment possibilities
from the higher incomes in these

it is also
possible that in developing countries
with paticularly low low
infrastructural base, a given
quantum of public investments
countries, although

would induce greater private sector
response, relatively speaking, than
could be expected in a developed
country.

An intersection point of a COC
and CIC schedule (say, E in figure l)
can be interpreted as a situation in
which, given the institutional and
behavioral characteristics of an
economy, private sector investment
(as well as sectoral economic
activity in general) is fully consistent
with the resources mobilizable by

the

prMate business sector, or,

equivalently,

that, based

on

available resources, the prevailing
level of economic activity in the
private sector is fully in line with the
possibilities offered by public-sector
operations, including investments in
infrastructural facilities. To apply this
framework in gauging the interaction
of crowding-in and crowding- out
effects in an adjustment policy
context, let us suppose that an
improvement in fiscal operations
leads to an unwinding of the
crowding-out effect, in the form of a
movement along the COC schedule
from E to G in figure l. Other things
remaining unchanged, use of the

additional available

resources

(PoPr) for productive purposes by
the private sector would, somewhat

paradoxically, require increased
public- sector outlays (by QoQr) on
complementary

the basis of the

relationships underlying

the

CIC

schedule. Given overall

fiscal
austerity, the necessary crowding-in
resources consistent with the
increased scope for private-sector

economic activity (by PoPr) yvould
have to be obtained in other ways,
equivalent to an outward shift in the
CIC schedule (e.9., from ClCr to

1991

with conditional assistance from the
IMF and/or the World Bank would
benefit from additional inflows from
a least the following sources: (i)
bilateral aid (possibly related to debt
rescheduling); (ii) (re) enhanced

export- credit facilities from
industrial country institutions;

direct foreign investment inflows; (iv)

financial assistance from regional
development banks; (v) return flows

of flight capital; (vi) improved
country perception by prMate
international bank lenders, lncluding

possible 'new money'; and

ClCz).

ln a policy reform conteld, such an

outward shift in the CIC schedule
could be effected essentially as part
of overall economic restructuring,
and not necessarily by means of
incrernental public-sector outlays.
For examples, commercialization or
privatization of some public utilities
or services would permit expansion
of such facilities without a direct

burden

on

public-sector fiscal

operations. Similarly, for given fiscal
parameters, liberalization
the

of

regulatory framework would make
possible the release of resources
hitherto allocated by the private
sector for compliance with (or
evasion of?) such control measures,

for more productive uses.

This

in a policy context,
the factors determining the
crowding-in effect should not be
suggests that,

seen only in quantitative terms.

For an adjusting

country

embarked on internal and external
liberalization, capital inflows, of
course, provides another means of
making up for slack in the

complementarity of crowding-in
factors with the unwinding of the
crowd-out effect. Relating such
inflow possibilities to the familiar

(iii)

(viD

where the requisite facilities permit,
enhanced prospects for portlollo

investment inflow.

On the

average, a

dollar

unlikely assumption that,

not
on

of
adjustment-based lending by one or

both of the Bretton Woods

institutions generates

an equal

amount from each of these sourcgs,

the

catalytic effect

of

such

multilateral assistance would thus
be roughly seven times the direct
assistance amount. To the sxtont

that inflows lrom the

varlous

sources depend, inter alh, on the
existing volume and qullty of the
factors determining crowdhg-h
responses, lncldence of the catalytlc

effect would vary even among
developing countries, with tho
nature of internal enaHing factors,
including the investment climate and
related regulations, as an important
determinant.

Being essenthlly

a

technlcal

coefficient, the crowd-ln effect and

its

operational slgnlflcance

ln

individual cases can, of course, be

quantified. Evklence from lndla,
taking other determinlng factors lnto

multilateral

account, indicates a measured
coefficient greater than unity and
close to two in terms of the

lending, one can envisage that a
strong reform program backed up

responsiveness of aggrogate private
capital formation in the agrlcultural

catalytic effect

of
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sector to incremental

public

investments in that sector
(Chakravarty, S., 1987). As noted
above, it seems reasonable to
expect that the degree of existing
infrastructural endowments

in

the
sectors

respective countries or
would play a significant role in
determining the numerical value of
the coefficient. On this basis, given
the generally more limited supply of
infrastructural facilities in Africa,
including the finding that availability
of all-weather transportation and
feeder roads on the continent is, on
average, only about 3 percent of the
corresponding situation in lndia
(Saad, A.A., and Simpson, M.C., p.
19), it may be supposed tlnt, in the
short run at least, the crowding-in
coefficient would be generally low,
and unlikely to exceed unity in the
African conte).t. ln any case, in

situations where there exists
substantial under-utilization of

installed capacity in the private
sector, the impact of incremental
public investments on business
profit margins is likely to be felt less
in terms of the crowding-in effect's
direct lowering of business costs
than via the stimulus given by such

investments to employment,
income, and consumer demand.

Clearly, intercountry variations in
this domain could be significant: for
example, the positive and relatively

speedy response of agricultural
producers to liberalization and other
incentive policies in Nigeria during
the 1980s has been attributed partly
to the expanded and fairly extensive
physical and
economic
infrastructure, including rural-sector
facilities, which permitted market

to be transmitted more
directly and transparently between
rural. sellers and urban buyers,
without 'exorbitant' margins for
distributors (Nigeria, 1988, p.4t; The
forces

Economist, November 3, 1990,
p.50); whereas in Madagascar,
"poor transportation and trade
facilities" have been cited as largely

contributing

to the finding that

liberalization and related measures
led to an improvement in the profit
margins for internal marketing and
distribution (i.e., non- tradables) as

compared

to

rural production

of

exportables (Hugon, P., 1988).

Another factor bearlng on the
behaviour of the crowding-in effect
in response to an unwinding of the

crowding-out effect as part of an
overall policy reform is the degree of
dependence on borrowed in relation
to equity funds in existing business
operations - i.e., capital gearing. The
extent of business self-financing in

developing countries has been
found to be generally low,
amounting to only about 50 per cent
of corresponding figures in the

industrial countries (lFC,
Padmanabhan, 1990),

1989;

partly
refl ecting typically the attractiveness
of administratively depressed

interest rates on bank loans over a

wide range, often coupled with
oligopolistic financial market
structures. ln such circumstances,
when an unwinding of the
crowding-out effect

is

combined
with interest rate reform, the
crowding-in response capacity of

1991

rural areas compared to 80 p€r cent

for the latter group of

countries
(IBRD, 1990; p. 238), would suggest
relatively smaller indigenous scope
in terms of the capacity of the

private business sector to tap
possible crowding-in effects of
macroeconomic and structural
policy retorms. Separately, for a
given crowding-in effect emanating
from public sector capital formation
activity, simultaneous increase in
domestic taxes will tend to weaken
the impact of the crowding-in effect
on business incentives, due to the
adverse implications of such levies
for business costs and net profit
margins.

On an economy-wide basls, the
comparatively weaker capacity of
African countries to capture the anticrowding-out potentials of
economic reform programs would
also seem indicated by the following
data (lBRD, ibid; lMF, 1990):

(i) investment ratio (1965-80, annual
average):
(a) Africa: 22.4 percent
(b) Other developing regions,
(except the Middle East): 25.4
percent

(ii)

Energy supply (kilograms of oll

the private sector would depend in
part on interest rate elasticity of

equivalent, commercial, 1 988) :
(a) Low-income Afrlca: 75.7
Other low-income countries:

activity.
rural and other
capital-intensive

(iii) Adult literacy rate (1985):
(a) Low-income Africa: 42.9 per

sectoral economic
the
relatively less

Accordingly,

sectors may be expected

to

have

stronger crowding-in

response
potential than other sectors. On this
basis, the fact that low-income

countries

in Africa generally

smaller rural sectors

have

than
comparable countries in the rest of

the world, with about 75 per cent of
their population in 1988 being in the

(b)

198.3

cent

(b)

Other low-income countries:

52.5 per cent

As in the specific case of
infrastructural facilities, the range
and quality of the existing capitai
stock

in an economy can be

expected

to day an important role
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ln shaplng hs crovdlngJn responses
lmprwed buslness otrtlook

to

stemmlng from flnanchl and other
pdlcy reforms. As a prory for the
capltal stock, lnformatlon based on
the behavlour of the investment ratio
durlng the decade and a half ended

ln

1980 suggests that

Africa

generally ls less well equlpped with
physlcal capltal resources than the

other developlng regions, thus
lmplylng a less strong capacity to
respond to economlc stlmuli
stemmlng from the urnvindlng of the
crowdlng-ont dect. The fact that

avallaHe commerchl enorgy supply

ln low-lncome Afrlcan countries is
on average less than a hall cf what

pranats

ln other comparable

countrles also leads to tho same
conduglon, as ls the substanthl
lnteneglonal gap ln the rate of adult
lfteracy. The latter factor probably
accounts, at least to a degree, for
some analysts' observation that

awarene$r

of the nature and

slgnlflcance of

adjustment
programmes are so little understood

by the puHlc ln Africa (Haggard,
1985, p.513; Nigeria, tg88; p. 5).

S.,

an

squeezlng

oconomy beyond

foreseeaUe rebound, would appear

to

orerlook the prospects of a
poslttue crowding-ln effect picking
up possiHe economlc slack related
to unwlnding of the crowding- ottt
effect, at least in part. Empirical
evidence provHes support for such

positive links

between
rnacroeconomic @lcy reforms and
recovery
micro- enterprises
actfuity: for e>ample, in Ghana, "...
When pollcy reforms stimulated an
economic recovery, the average
firms
employment level
(Marsden,
p.8).
..."
K.,
1990;
doubled

of

in

Given that micro-level enterprises'
policy reforms,
operating via the crowding-in effect,
depend importantly on availability of
publicly financed facilities, serious
concern with the impact of such
reforms on economic activity and
related objectMes would require
careful attention to the unwinding of

respons€s

the

to

crowding-out effect

as

an

element of fiscal reconsolidation, so

as to

minimize

adverse
business
reform policies. ln this

repercussions

on

to
contelt, he oft-noted tendency for
resp( rses

policy authorities to

III.

CONCLUSIONS AND

IMPLICATIONS

curtail
by
concentrating on cuts in investment
and maintenance expenditures can

budgetary excesses

ard

hardly be helpful. ldeally, for a
specified necessary cut-back in
budgetary operations, the split

the demand but also the supply side

between current operating and other
expenditures would need to be done

Jolnt analysis of the crowding-out

crowding-in effects permits
slmultaneous focusing on not only
lmpacts of flnanchl and related
pdlcy reforms, especially in cases

relying on a market-oriented, private
gectordrlven adjustment and
grorth strategy. ln this connection,

arguments by some analysts (e.9.,
Slnger, H.W., 1989) that prolonged

market-oriented adjustment efforts
could produce a kind of adverse
hysteretic effect in the sense of

so as to avoid marked disparity at

the margin in the likely

overall

benefits from these outlays, and

especially

so as to

provide

maximum possible scope for the
crowding-in effect. ln general, the
structure of capital expenditures and
their crowding-in linkage potential
would also reward close scrutiny,

especially

in cases

where

economy-wlde pollcy relonne are
being carrled out under drong
lntemal prossures for emfloyrnent

and growth. ln short,

cardd
interfacing of the unwlndlng of the
crowdlng-out effect on the one hand
the
bulldlng-up

and the

of

crowding-in effect on the dhor,
provkies a means of Uendlng the
adjustment and growth dlmenslons
of puHic policy.
It would, however, be superflchl to
visualize policies aimed at

rnaxlmlzation

of

crowdlng-ln

potenthl only in quantitative terms,
since there are other factors which

can hinder the

capacrty of
to effectively
utilize such potenthls. Clearly,
households and firms

over-regulation of economlc activhy,

by unduly addlng on coSts, can
severely detract from business
profitability, thereby

impairlng
crowding-in incentives. For
example, cases have been kJentlfi€d
prospective

in which" ...a

entrepreneur.. to set up a small
garment factory ...(must) spend 289

working days dealing

wlth

regulations, "and where" ... it toof

more than

2

years

to

reglster s

minibus route" (IBRD, ibid, p.&A); ln
another case, it took" ... an averags

of 18

in

months
approving
investment licences" (Kruger, A.O.,
1990, p. 16). Some analysts believe

qualitative aspects of the
crowding-in effect are particularly
unfavourable in African countries,
in the ta:< and
arguing that
regulatory areas ... there is a long
way to go before African enterprises
can compete on an equal footing
with countries in Asia and the

that

Caribbean" (Marsden, op.cit., p. 17).

Combined with the comparatively
scanty infrastructural facllities, this
phenomenon of over-regulation
calls for special efforts on the part of
similar

the African and other
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countries, to minimlze obstacles to
full realization of the crowding-in

effects of economic and financial
policy reforms. As a step in this
direction, the so-called one'stop
approach can be expected to prove
h€lfful as it permlts all regulatory
approvals for investment activrty to
be obtained within one lnstitutional

location, ileally combined with
"sunsd provisions" under which
such approvals would be deemed
autornatlcally granted in the
absence of contrary information
durlng a specified time lnterval.
Operationally, for specilied

reallzed values of macro policy
instrument variaHes such as (net)
domestlc banklng system credlt,
fiscal receipts or expendltures, and
all else rernaihing unchanged, their
lmpact on pollcy objectives relating
to, say, growth, emdoyment, and
the balance cf payments worrld
depend on the interaction of the
crording-out effect unwindlng and
the buildup of the crordlng-in effect.
lntercountry dlfferences in the

factors shaping strch lnteracdon
suggest that the nd effect wqld
tend to vary from cas€ to eaee. For
example, among adjustment pdby

packages featuring lnterest rato
reform, the net effect would depend
partly
crowding-ln
responses are affected by tho
interest rate elasticity of investment
in individual cases, just as business

on how

responses

to

compression

aggregBte dernand

uMer an

overall

adjustment progmm would depend,
via the Accelerator Principle, partly
on entrepreneurs' assessments of

the impact of such restralnts on
consumer demand in their
respective markets

at home and

abroad.

The fbregoing suggeC that close
evaluation of the behavlour of the
crowding-out
crowding-ln
effects in individual cases would
provide useful indlcators of the lkely

employment, and the balancc of
paym€nts. Thls rncns, ln tum, tret
careful examlnatlon of the factors
stuping such behavlour h lndh/dual

cases would contrlbute to an
lmproved understandlng of tho

modus operandi of an economy as
well as its adjustment process. Srch
an approach would also encourago
country authorltles and other
lnterested parties to lmprove data
cdlectlon on mlcro{evel economlc
actlvlty, lncludlng cost $ructurea.
For Afrlcan countries, ln paftlcular,
avallaUe evldence suggosts that

lmprovement of lnfrastructural
lacllitles and other dements d

soclal overhead capltal wtl
contrlbute to an enharced
dfectlveness

d

economlc

and

flnanch! pollcy reform programs.

and

impact of macroeconomic and
structural adjustment measures on
the economy, including prospects
for aggregate investment, growth,

I
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